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Saving the Space: How Free Speech 
Zones on College Campuses Advance 
Free Speech Values 
Troy Lange* 
“The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence 
of an organized society maintaining public order, without which 
liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.”  
– Justice Arthur J. Goldberg1
INTRODUCTION 
On March 2nd, 2019, President Donald Trump announced his 
intention to issue an executive order that would force colleges to 
“guarantee” free speech rights for their students.2  On March 21st, 
the President did in fact issue an order to this effect.3  While there 
is likely no meaningful legal effect to the order, in that it only holds 
schools to standards to which they were already held,4 it is 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.S.,
2017, Roger Williams University. 
1. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
2. Michael D. Shear, Trump Says He Will Sign Free Speech Order for
College Campuses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2019/03/02/us/politics/trump-free-speech-colleges.html [https://perma.cc/Q53 
Q-HAYU].
3. Susan Svrluga, Trump Signs Executive Order on Free Speech on
College Campuses, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2019), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/03/21/trump-expected-sign-exec 
utive-order-free-speech/?utm_term=.ec25bc47c1f9 [https://perma.cc/KMD5-
TZMF]. 
4. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Trump Signs Broad Executive Order, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/ 
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nevertheless an indication of a popular point of contention: that 
college students, especially conservatives, are being stripped of 
their free speech rights on campuses across the nation.5  While the 
merits of such a claim are up for debate,6 there are other issues 
involving free speech on campus that have nothing to do with school 
administrators. 
University campuses have been the sites for many pitched 
political battles in the past few years.  In February of 2017, 
“provocateur” Milo Yiannopoulos was invited to speak at the 
University of California, Berkeley, by the school’s College 
Republicans.7  However, Yiannopoulos was unable to go through 
with his speech because the event was disrupted by violent 
protestors.8  Fires were set, windows were broken, and supporters 
were attacked; all told, the school incurred over $100,000 in 
property damage.9  
In March of the same year, controversial author Charles 
Murray was invited to speak at Middlebury College in Vermont.10 
Murray is known for co-writing the 1994 book The Bell Curve, 
which argues in part that the class structure in America is 
predominately shaped by IQ rather than other factors such as 
03/22/white-house-executive-order-prods-colleges-free-speech-program-level-
data-and-risk [https://perma.cc/P5MX-3QT2]. 
5. Osita Nwanevu, Trump’s Free-Speech Executive Order and the Right’s
Fixation on Campus Politics, NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:18 PM), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/current/trumps-free-speech-executive-
order-and-the-rights-fixation-with-campus-politics [https://perma.cc/W5H5-
2FTM]. 
6. For a brief, reasoned discussion of free speech issues from an opponent
of speech regulation, see Robert Shibley, Is There a Free Speech “Crisis” on 
Campus?, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC. (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://www.thefire.org/is-there-a-free-speech-crisis-on-campus/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LF77-RBFZ]. 
7. Madison Park and Kyung Lah, Berkeley Protests of Yiannopoulos
Caused $100,000 in Damage, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017, 8:33 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/01/us/milo-yiannopoulos-berkeley/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J9HD-DZTV]. 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Middlebury is a private university.  This paper will focus solely on
public universities for purposes of a constitutional discussion; this example is 
provided to show another instance of violence sparked by the identity and ideas 
of a speaker on a college campus. 
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education, upbringing, or socioeconomic status of one’s family.11 
That argument is considered controversial, because if class 
structures are determined almost entirely by one’s intelligence, and 
class structures are sharply divided along racial lines in the United 
States, then it necessarily follows that Murray believes some races 
are naturally “smarter” than others.12 After disruptions by 
students in the crowd, Murray had to be escorted to another room 
to deliver his speech via live stream.13  At the conclusion of the 
event, Murray and Middlebury professor Allison Stanger were 
heckled, trapped, and physically assaulted by protestors outside of 
the venue.14 
Perhaps the most infamous of these selected events is the 
“Unite the Right” rally which took place in Charlottesville, Virginia 
in August of 2017.  Although the more notorious events took place 
on Saturday, August 12th, the events which concern this paper took 
place the prior evening on the campus of the University of 
Virginia.15  Supporters of the rally met on the university’s campus, 
ignited tiki torches, and marched across campus where they 
 11. Charles Murray, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., 
https://www.aei.org/scholar/charles-murray/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019); 
Natalie Goodnow, ‘The Bell Curve’ 20 Years Later: A Q&A with Charles 
Murray, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Oct. 16, 2014, 1:57 PM) 
https://www.aei.org/publication/bell-curve-20-years-later-qa-charles-murray/.  
12. Goodnow, supra note 11.  Murray claims to be “agnostic” about
whether intelligence is a result of genetics, environment, or some combination 
of both, but showed his true colors when he said “[w]e’re not talking about 
another 20 years before the purely environmental position is discredited, but 
probably less than a decade.  What happens when a linchpin of political 
correctness becomes scientifically untenable?  It should be interesting to 
watch.  I confess to a problem with schadenfreude.” Id. 
13. Taylor Gee, How the Middlebury Riot Really Went Down, POLITICO
(May 28, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/05/28/how-
donald-trump-caused-the-middlebury-melee-215195 [https://perma.cc/E2MB-
VUET]; Sasha Goldstein, ‘Mob’ Attacks Middlebury Prof and Controversial 
Speaker Charles Murray, SEVEN DAYS VT. (Mar. 4, 2017, 11:57 AM), 
https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2017/03/03/mob-attacks-
middlebury-prof-and-controversial-speaker-charles-murray [https://perma.cc/ 
Y5S2-SRY9]. 
14. Goldstein, supra note 13.
15. Michael Bragg, Sullivan: UVa Expected Friday March, but Details
Changed, DAILY PROGRESS (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www. 
dailyprogress.com/news/local/sullivan-uva-expected-friday-march-but-details-
changed/article_4da25544-8224-11e7-b698-2ba29675c95d.html [https://perma 
.cc/4347-RTGH]. 
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eventually clashed with counter-protestors at the Thomas Jefferson 
statue.16  University security took a rather hands-off approach to 
the situation, despite being aware of the group’s intent to come to 
campus and use torches (although they were misled about exactly 
where on campus the group would be).17 
What could these schools have done to prevent violence from 
erupting on their campuses? One easy answer jumps out 
immediately: disallow controversial speakers and groups from 
coming to campus.  Of course, for public universities, that would 
violate current First Amendment jurisprudence as it would be a 
content-based prior restraint on speech.18  The next easy answer, 
then, is disallow all outside speakers and groups from coming to 
campus.  Better yet, just disallow all speaking events and 
demonstrations in general, so that there is no opportunity for a 
crowd to get worked up and violent.  The problem for public 
universities is that their administrators are state actors, meaning 
they are subject to the commands of the Constitution.19  However, 
not all publicly owned property is always accessible to the public, 
nor for all purposes.  In fact, quite the opposite: accessibility to 
government property is managed in a way so that the government 
can fulfill the purposes for which said property was set aside in the 
first place.20  This concept has been embodied in the “public forum 
doctrine” of First Amendment jurisprudence. 
One way that schools have sought to effectively manage speech 
on their campus is to establish “free speech zones.”  A “free speech 
zone” (or area) is a place on a college campus, typically an open, 
outdoor space, that is set aside by the university as a place for 
speech and other expression.21  Although dubbed “free speech 
zones,” a university may still subject speech and expression in these 
16. Id.
17. HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 2017 PROTEST 
EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 1, 116–119 (2017), https:// 
www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charlottesville-
Critical-Incident-Review-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/A66D-H8EQ]. 
18. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 134
(1992). 
19. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
20. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966).
21. See Jennifer R. Huddleston, Note, Free Speech in the Age of Political
Correctness: Removing Free Speech Zones on College Campuses to Encourage 
Civil Discourse, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 279, 280–81 (2017). 
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areas to time, place, and manner restrictions.22  These “zones” are 
controversial for a number of reasons.  Calling an area a “free 
speech zone” but nevertheless subjecting speech in said area to a 
variety of restrictions seems like the kind of doublespeak that 
would have George Orwell turning in his grave.  Opponents of these 
zones contend that they are used not to set aside areas for students 
to express themselves, but rather to restrict speech and expressive 
rights in all other parts of campus outside of the free speech zone.23 
Opponents also claim that universities are meant to be places for 
students to have their ideas challenged, and if administrators 
continue to implement policies which restrict student speech, then 
students will be too sheltered and will not know how to confront 
uncomfortable or even dangerous ideas.24  Another concern lies 
with allowing university administrators to allocate the use of those 
areas, as they are generally perceived as being friendly only to left-
leaning ideas.25  Some commenters have asserted that free speech 
zones are unconstitutional period.26 
This Comment will argue that free speech zones on college 
campuses can be legally created by university administrators so 
long as they are implemented within the existing constitutional 
framework.  On the other hand, it will argue that if a university 
implements a free speech zone policy that severely limits speech 
and expression in other open, outdoor areas of campus, that policy 
runs afoul of the Constitution.  It will also demonstrate that free 
speech zones, if managed properly, can help advance the important 
goals of promoting vigorous debate, ensuring students are exposed 
22. See Neal H. Hutchens & Frank Fernandez, Searching for Balance with
Student Free Speech: Campus Speech Zones, Institutional Authority, and 
Legislative Prerogatives, 5 BELMONT L. REV. 103, 115, 117 (2018). 
23. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Speakers Cornered, REASON (Feb. 5, 2004),
http://reason.com/archives/2004/02/05/speakers-cornered [https://perma.cc/ 
JR9H-DDHS]. 
24. See Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American
Mind, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 
2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/ [https://perma.cc/9TQT-
KHQ7]. 
25. See Scott Jaschik, Professors and Politics: What the Research Says,
INSIDE HIGHER ED, (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
news/2017/02/27/research-confirms-professors-lean-left-questions-
assumptions-about-what-means [https://perma.cc/335L-T64V]. 
26. See Hutchens & Fernandez, supra, note 22, at 105; Huddleston, supra,
note 21, at 281–82. 
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to a diverse range of ideas, and protecting students and speakers 
from violent backlash.  Following this Introduction, Part I will 
provide the current legal framework that governs public university 
campuses and restrictions of speech and expression thereon, along 
with an example of a well-crafted spatial expression regulation. 
Part II will discuss how properly implemented free speech zones are 
more protective of free expression and capable of advancing First 
Amendment rationales than critics suggest. Ultimately, this 
Comment stands for the idea that given the realities of speaker 
practices, political polarization, and campus life, campus 
administrators are left with a difficult choice regarding expression 
on their campuses, and that free speech zones and other spatial 
policies are a viable solution resting between the alternatives of 
limiting speech to the greatest extent possible or standing aside 
while disorder reigns. 
I. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES
A. Origins of the Doctrine
Although the right to free speech and expression is considered
one of the most important ideals of American society, the current 
understanding of freedom of speech on government owned property 
has not always been the dominant view.  In the late nineteenth 
century, the United States Supreme Court (the Court) in Davis v. 
Massachusetts cemented the view that the government as property 
owner and manager had every right to “absolutely or conditionally 
. . . forbid public speaking” on said property.27  Within just a few 
decades, however, critical societal attitudes about property which 
previously justified such a holding began to change.28  By 1939, the 
Court in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization pivoted 
from allowing a legislature to “absolutely or conditionally” prohibit 
speech on public property to not allowing the government to forbid 
certain groups from engaging in the same type of activity that was 
otherwise permitted in a given place.29  Despite being a two-justice 
27. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897).
28. See David S. Allen, Spatial Frameworks and the Management of
Dissent: From Parks to Free Speech Zones, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 396-401 
(2011). 
29. See 307 U.S. 496, 505–06 (1939) (Roberts, J., plurality opinion); see also
Allen, supra note 28, at 400–01. 
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plurality opinion, one can find the quote which became the basis of 
the modern public forum doctrine in Hague, where Justice Owen 
Roberts declared “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, 
they have immemorially been held in trust for use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”30 
Interestingly, Hague did not have occasion to overturn Davis.31 
The property at issue in Davis, the Boston Common, “was 
absolutely under the control of the legislature” with regulations 
aimed at many activities (not just ones concerning civil rights) to 
ensure “enjoyment in parks.”32  Thus, the plaintiff had no right to 
use the property except as permitted.33  On the other hand, the 
policy at issue in Hague, which forbid labor union members from 
holding meetings in outdoor spaces, was directed only at the 
exchange of ideas and did not have the purpose of maintaining the 
peace or otherwise ensuring certain uses for specific public places; 
thus, it could not withstand the constitutional challenge.34 
Although it seems like the town could simply have limited access to 
the public places to ensure “comfort or convenience in the use of 
streets or parks,” Justice Roberts implied that even if maintaining 
order was the purpose of the town’s permitting scheme, the labor 
union could still have held its meetings in the same manner and the 
same place when he noted that the union members were at all 
relevant times “acting in an orderly and peaceful manner.”35  The 
Hague decision can thus be seen as the progenerate of the idea that 
in certain places, the government must allow access to the public 
for expressive conduct.36 
30. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.  Justice Roberts went on to add that these
kinds of uses have “from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”  Id.  For an insightful explanation 
of how the Court could have concluded as it did in Davis considering Justice 
Roberts’ strong language used just forty years later, see Allen, supra note 28, 
at 388–399. 
31. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
32. Id. at 514–15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 515.
34. See id. at 516.
35. See id. at 504–05, 515–16.
36. This has been called the “guaranteed access” rationale of public fora.
See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1214 (19th 
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The decision in Hague was not based solely on the fact that the 
union members could not have their rights to speech and expression 
abridged under the guise of maintaining public spaces, but was also 
partially founded on the fact that permits were needed to use the 
streets or parks for expressive conduct and such permits could be 
granted or denied on the “mere opinion” of the town’s Director of 
Safety.37  That part of the ruling was reaffirmed a decade later in 
Niemotko v. Maryland, where the Court found that a town 
“practice” which vested “all authority to grant permits” for using 
the park at issue in city administrators was invalid on its face for 
failing to articulate a “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite 
standard for the officials to follow.”38  The thinking behind the 
prohibition against unbridled discretion—that such discretion 
essentially amounts to a “prior restraint on . . . speech” because of 
its potential to be arbitrarily wielded39—is part of the basis for 
another rationale of the public forum doctrine: “equal access.”40 
B. Current Framework
To begin the discussion of the legal framework within which
state entities must act, it is important to keep in mind the kinds of 
speech which are afforded no constitutional protection.  University 
administrators will, of course, want to minimize or eliminate these 
kinds of speech and may do so without controversy as they are 
already outside of the Constitution’s protections.  The first kind of 
unprotected speech is “fighting words,” or face-to-face words which 
are likely to elicit a violent response from a reasonable person.41 
Another category of unprotected speech is incitement, or speech 
which has the purpose of and is likely to elicit a violent or otherwise 
lawless response from the listener.42  Lastly, the Court has noted 
that student-on-student harassment in an educational setting is 
prohibited by Title IX when it is “so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive” that it effectively prevents the victim from 
ed. 2016); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. 
Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13–19 (1965). 
37. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516.
38. 340 U.S. 268, 271–72 (1951) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. See id. at 271.
40. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 1214.
41. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942).
42. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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obtaining equal access to an educational opportunity.43 It is 
important to note, however, that one-off comments, even those 
targeting a member of a protected group, will not qualify as 
“harassment.”44  Rather, there must be a “systemic effect” on the 
victim in regards to inhibiting his or her access to an educational 
program or opportunity.45 
The public forum doctrine dictates in what ways campus 
administrators may regulate otherwise protected forms of speech. 
The Court first laid out a comprehensive scheme for forum analysis 
in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Association.46  The Court does an analysis of the forum to 
determine in which category of forum it fits; the first of these 
categories is traditional public fora, which are those places that 
have “by long tradition,” or “immemorially” been used for assembly 
and expression.47  Speech in these fora may only be limited with 
content neutral time, manner, and place restrictions which are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest while 
leaving available “ample alternative channels of communication.”48 
Importantly, “the government may not prohibit all communicative 
activity” in traditional public fora.49  Traditional public fora are the 
very embodiment of the idea that in some places, the government is 
required to “guarantee access” for its citizens to gather, debate, and 
otherwise express themselves.50 
The next category of public forum is the designated public 
forum, which is a place that the government “has opened for use by 
the public as a place for expressive activity.”51  Once the area has 
been opened for expressive activity, the government must hold said 
venue open for all who wish to use it as long as it is still open to 
expressive conduct, subject to the same constitutional requirements 
as traditional public fora.52  The key to the designated forum is that 
43. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
44. Id. at 651–52.
45. See id. at 652–53.
46. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
47. Id. at 45.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 1214.
51. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
52. Id. at 45–46.
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it actually must be designated as a place for expressive conduct, in 
contrast with traditional fora which exist merely as a result of their 
physical characteristics.53  There are two “sub-sets” of designated 
fora.  The labelling of the different forum types within the doctrine 
has been the subject of some confusion and inconsistency.54  For 
clarity’s sake, this Comment will speak in terms of “designated” and 
“limited” public fora.  The former is when a public place is opened 
for all kinds of expressive conduct.55  A limited public forum, on the 
other hand, is one that has been designated as a public forum, but 
only as to certain uses, such as use by certain groups of people, 
certain kinds of activity, or the discussion of certain topics.56  As for 
restrictions on the limited variety of public fora, the government 
may impose reasonable, content-neutral restrictions.57  Both 
designated and limited public fora can be understood as coming 
from the “equal access” rationale of the public forum doctrine in 
dictating that once the government has opened a place to 
expression, or certain kinds of expression, anyone may come to 
engage in said types of expression in those places regardless of their 
viewpoint.58 
Lastly is the “nonpublic” forum, or a property which is owned 
by the government that is not for expressive conduct and has not 
been designated for expressive conduct.59  The rules regarding this 
category of government property recognize the fact that the “First 
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because 
it is owned or controlled by the government.”60  The government 
operates a wide variety of properties, so this is a sensible rule which 
grants the government the authority to ensure its property is used 
53. See id.
54. See Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975–76 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing
how different courts at different times have used the same label to mean 
different forum types, or different labels to mean the same forum type). 
55. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661, 679 n.11 (2010). 
56. Id. (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009));
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
57. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11.
58. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 1214.
59. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
60. Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns,
453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)) (internal quotation omitted). 
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for the purposes for which it was initially set aside.61  The 
government can enforce content neutral time, manner, and place 
restrictions as necessary to ensure this goal, “as long as the 
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s 
view.”62 
In Widmar v. Vincent, decided before Perry, the Court had 
occasion to discuss public fora specifically in the public university 
context.  It was noted that “the campus of a public university, at 
least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a 
public forum.”63  When the Court used the term “public forum,” it 
almost certainly meant “traditional public forum,” as evidenced by 
the fact that the Court referred to this category simply as “public 
forum” in Perry.64  In the same footnote, however, the Court 
explained that although students are entitled to their First 
Amendment rights on campus, the school context is not to be 
ignored.65  So, although different physical locations on a public 
university campus may look like a traditional public forum, they 
“differ[] in significant respects” from these fora because the 
property on which they reside is dedicated for the purpose of 
education.66  Thus, university officials can impose “reasonable 
regulations” on speech and expression on their campuses which are 
“compatible” with furthering their educational mission.67  School 
administrators may also differentiate between students and non-
students in deciding whether and when to grant access to campus 
facilities.68  This differentiation of allowed users based on group 
membership was explained in Perry to be a way of creating a limited 
public forum.69 
61. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
62. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
63. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981).
64. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
65. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
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C. Constitutionally Permissible Free Speech Zones
Based on the public forum framework, school administrators
are afforded especially wide latitude in designating spaces on their 
campus as different types of public fora.  Any regulations on campus 
speech seemingly only need to be “reasonable” and “compatible with 
[the school’s educational mission].”70  That requirement is a far cry 
from the strict scrutiny required for traditional public fora.  At first 
blush, it might seem that since university campuses have 
specifically been differentiated from traditional public fora, and 
traditional public fora are the only kinds serving the “guaranteed 
access” rationale of the public forum doctrine, that a school 
administrator could simply bar all expressive conduct on its 
campus.71  This, after all, would be granting “equal access” (or non-
access) to all people in a content neutral manner.  However, it would 
be hard to find one who agrees that a flat ban on speech and 
expressive conduct on campus is either “reasonable” or “compatible” 
with the mission of education.72  
An excellent example of a free speech zone-like policy73 is the 
policy concerning outdoor areas at the University of Virginia.  The 
detailed and comprehensive policy provides that students, student 
groups, and university employees may “utilize outdoor University 
property for public speaking or distribution of literature, so long as 
they do not impede normal operations or obstruct pedestrian or 
vehicular traffic.”74  Non-students may use the outdoor spaces so 
long as they reserve a given space at least one week in advance (but 
70. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
71. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
72. See id. at 46; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5. This proposition is leaving
aside outliers such as the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a military-style 
academy, which almost certainly does have an academic interest in 
suppressing student expression.  See Regimental System, VA. MIL. INST., 
https://www.vmi.edu/cadet-life/cadet-leadership-and-development/regimental 
-system/ [https://perma.cc/N5XX-HSQ3] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).  The
stated proposition applies to other run-of-the-mill public colleges and
universities which do not have military-grade discipline as part of their core
academic mission.
73. That is, it is not called a free speech zone, but mirrors in many ways
the kinds of policies decried by critics. 
74. PRM-017: Use of University Facilities or Property and Limits on Direct
Solicitation and Advertising, U. VA. (Aug. 16, 2019), https://uvapolicy. 
virginia.edu/policy/PRM-017 [https://perma.cc/HZ8J-V99K]. 
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not more than four weeks), with reservations being “allocated on a 
space-available basis with priority given to student 
groups/organizations and [students and employees].”75  The policy 
prohibits people from disrupting invited speakers or their 
listeners.76  Advertising, sales, and solicitation are prohibited, 
except for student groups raising funds, which is only permitted in 
some of the outdoor spaces.77  When a speaker reserves one of the 
outdoor areas, they are allocated a two-hour block; non-students are 
limited to one two-hour block per week and once a non-student has 
one outdoor space reserved, no other outdoor spaces may be 
reserved by non-students during that two hour timeslot.78  Each 
outdoor space has a maximum number of people for which it may 
be reserved.79  Notably, the policy does not attempt to regulate 
expression in any outdoor space besides those expressly subject to 
the policy. 
What the above-detailed policy represents is a set of rules that 
provides an advantage to both speakers and administrators in 
instances of controversial speakers.  Take, for example, the “Unite 
the Right” rally and how the events on the University of Virginia’s 
campus may have played out differently with this policy in place. 
If the rally-goers wanted to express themselves on campus, they 
would simply have needed to reserve a relevant space at least one 
week in advance, something that would have been relatively easy 
given the rally had been planned for that weekend some time in 
advance.80  They could have then arrived on campus and proceeded 
to their reserved space and engaged in (subject to other campus 
rules, such as the open-flame policy81) whatever sort of expression 
they so desired, so long as they did not pass into the realm of 
unprotected speech.  The policy would protect the rally-goers, since 
any opponents who attempted to interrupt them would be subject 
to discipline by the school.  The advance notice provided to the 
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, supra note 17, at 110.
81. SEC-032: Open Burn and Open Flame Operations at the University of
Virginia, U. VA. (Sept. 13, 2017), http://uvapolicy.virginia.edu/policy/SEC-032 
[https://perma.cc/JV73-SJBG]. 
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University would have allowed for the campus police to oversee the 
event. 
In this rose-colored version of events, administrators would be 
at least satiated by being apprised of the rally-goers’ arrival well in 
advance.  Perhaps they would face backlash for allowing the 
presence of such a hateful group on campus, but they could defend 
the decision by saying that the speakers complied with the 
University policies, and that the University was fulfilling its 
commitment to supporting free expression.  If things did not go so 
swimmingly, the University could take recursive action.  If the 
speakers flouted, for example, the open-flame policy, or marched 
across campus (i.e., outside of their reserved space), then the 
University could declare the assembly “unlawful” and order the 
arrest or removal from campus of the rally-goers.82  If there were 
too many rowdy or violent counter-protestors for campus police to 
handle, they could reschedule or relocate the event perhaps to an 
area of campus more easily secured, such as an auditorium.83 
This section has covered how a university can create a free 
speech zone within the bounds of the Constitution.  While it is fairly 
clear that that can be done as a legal matter, it is less clear at this 
point that doing so is good policy.  It is important to keep the legal 
framework in mind when examining whether it is wise for a 
university to take steps similar to those taken by the University of 
Virginia in crafting spatial expression policies. 
II. HOW FREE SPEECH ZONES ADVANCE FIRST AMENDMENT
RATIONALES 
A. First Amendment Rationales
The First Amendment is at once a great contribution to
individual liberties and something of a puzzle.  The text (relevant 
82. See HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, supra note 17, at 120.
83. In the fall of 2017, Milo Yiannopoulos returned to U.C. Berkeley where
he demanded to speak in a wide-open outdoor space, but university officials 
wanted to move him inside because of the fear of a repeat of his first visit; 
Yiannopoulos refused, but was at least relocated to a less-open outdoor space 
which was more easily secured, where he delivered his speech more or less 
without incident.  Andrew Marantz, Fighting Words: How Social-Media Trolls 
Turned U.C. Berkeley into a Free-Speech Circus, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/02/how-social-media-trolls-
turned-uc-berkeley-into-a-free-speech-circus [https://perma.cc/MWB2-WDVP]. 
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to this discussion) merely provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”84  Although one who reads 
these words might understandably think that Congress cannot 
make any law which would “abridge” freedom of speech in any way, 
they would be decidedly wrong.  Nobody could contend that the 
First Amendment absolutely prohibits limitations on speech.  Just 
what the government may do in terms of “abridging” speech has 
been the subject of considerable debate.  Arguments for or against 
regulations on speech and expression are generally grounded in 
three rationales: the “marketplace of ideas” theory, the need for 
democratic self-government, and the promotion of individual 
autonomy.85 
The marketplace of ideas theory is perhaps of most concern to 
the debate about speech regulations on campus.  As the Supreme 
Court itself noted, “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding 
environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”86  The thinking 
goes that ideas will “compete” with one another, and the truth, 
embodied in the “better” ideas, will carry the day by “winning” the 
support of the marketplace listeners.  Much of modern-day 
marketplace theory can be attributed to John Stuart Mill, who 
posited that both “truth” and “falsehoods” are valuable in the 
marketplace, because the latter can steer people to the truth by 
being exposed for what it is and being soundly defeated by the 
former.87  Accepting that assumption as true, the marketplace 
must be free of government regulation so that it can be as wide-
open as possible to allow for all ideas to come and compete within. 
The guarantee of free speech is also explained by the need of 
the people to govern themselves in a democracy.  This rationale 
implies that “political speech” or speech of “public concern” is more 
valuable than other forms of speech and should be afforded greater 
protection.  The importance of self-government perhaps best 
explains the Court’s decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, where 
it “consider[ed] this case against the background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 935.
86. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972).
87. See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 935–36 (discussing JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859)). 
210 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:195 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”88  The self-
government theory explains the Court’s strong desire to protect 
political speech, which it does by making such speech immune from 
incurring civil liability (which would be a form of state action 
inhibiting said speech). Thus, the rationale of Sullivan 
demonstrates that the first two free speech arguments can overlap 
considerably in that the “marketplace” is held open and free of 
restrictions especially for “political speech.”  One can therefore 
glean that there is a sense that political speech is more valuable to 
the marketplace and thus attempts to keep it out of the 
marketplace are suspect.  Interestingly, affording protection for 
political speech because of its assigned higher value can be 
characterized as a “regulation” on the marketplace, in that courts 
ensure that non-political speech may not “win” over political 
speech.89 
Lastly, and of significant concern to the college setting, is the 
notion that freedom of speech ensures the people expressive and 
cognitive autonomy.  As Justice Brandeis declared in his resonant 
and stirring concurrence in Whitney v. California, the founders 
“valued liberty both as an end and as a means,” and that “the final 
end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties.”90 
The autonomy rationale almost speaks for itself in that there is just 
something fulfilling about being able to think and act for oneself; 
indeed, there is almost no end to the theme of autonomy and the 
self-fulfillment that accompanies liberty in literature,91 film,92 and 
music,93 all of which tend to reflect what humans hold dear to their 
hearts.  The importance of dissent in and of itself can be explained 
entirely by the autonomy theory, in that we find it important to 
88. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
89. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 264–66
(1992). 
90. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). 
91. See, e.g., RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953); GEORGE ORWELL,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
92. See, e.g., BRAVEHEART (Icon Productions & The Ladd Company 1995);
THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999). 
93. See, e.g., BEASTIE BOYS, (You Gotta) Fight for Your Right (to Party!), on 
LICENSED TO ILL (Def Jam Records 1986); RAGE AGAINST THE MACHINE, Killing 
in the Name, on RAGE AGAINST THE MACHINE (Sony Music Entertainment Inc. 
1992).  
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allow people to be contrarians if they so desire, even if it is just for 
the sake of their individual liberty.94  Dissent, of course, plays an 
important role in self-government, and when dissent is of a political 
nature, it will be assigned a higher value even if it is unpopular. 
The protection of dissent and other unpopular ideas is at the heart 
of the famous (and perhaps even cliché) quote, “I disapprove of what 
you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it,”95 oft 
employed by those opposed to what they perceive to be some stifling 
of speech. 
One more rationale which plays a part in explaining 
constitutional protection for free speech is the general distrust of 
government.96  That rationale scrutinizes both the government’s 
ability to regulate speech and its motivation to do so.97  That is, the 
government lacks the ability to adequately and effectively regulate 
speech in a way that is sufficient to serve the previously discussed 
rationales to the maximum extent possible while not limiting what 
should be protected speech.98  The government, especially in a 
democracy, also has a motivation to stifle the speech of its political 
opponents whether to protect its own policies from criticism or to 
simply punish dissenters; this author wishes that the latter concern 
could be described as cynical rather than realistic.99  There are, 
however, ways of checking this concern without disallowing the 
government from partaking in any sort of speech regulation 
whatsoever.  
B. Competing Interest: Academic Freedom
On one side of the scale in the debate of student free speech on
college campuses is the academic freedom of school administrators. 
One might reasonably ask: How can “academic freedom” be used to 
regulate the actions of students and campus visitors outside of the 
classroom?  This would be getting at an important point: when 
94. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
95. S.G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1906) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 
96. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 939–40 (quoting FREDERICK
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1982)). 
97. Id. (quoting SCHAUER, supra note 96, at 81).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 940.
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examining actions which could be characterized in one way or 
another as restrictions on student speech imposed by school 
administrators, current jurisprudence calls for more deference to 
the administrator the more connected the restriction is to a 
classroom purpose, and more protection for speech the more 
attenuated the speech is from the classroom.  
This sliding scale can be gleaned from the Court’s decision in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
wherein it stated that for “school officials to justify prohibition of a 
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its 
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid 
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”100  The Court went further to say that, 
specifically outside the classroom setting, students “may express 
[their] opinions, even on controversial subjects . . . if [they] do so 
without ‘materially and substantially interfere[ing] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.”101  Thus, 
high school students who wore black armbands to school to express 
their disapproval of the Vietnam war could not be punished for such 
expression.102 
On the other end of the scale is Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, which involved the suppression of student written 
articles in a high school newspaper which was printed as part of a 
journalism class’s curriculum.103  The articles were removed from 
the regularly scheduled publication of the paper because they 
discussed the experience of some pregnant students and the impact 
of divorce on some students at the school.104  The Court upheld the 
decision to delete these articles because they were merely 
“exercising editorial control over the style and content” of student 
speech in a way that was “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns,” such as the danger of breaching the 
anonymity of pregnant students and concern for the material being 
100. 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
101. Id. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 353 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)). 
102. Id. at 514.
103. 484 U.S. 260, 262–64 (1988).
104. Id. at 263–64.
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inappropriate for younger students.105  This latter standard affords 
much less protection to student speech than the Tinker standard 
based on the differing contexts (i.e., speech not materially related 
to the classroom and speech that is part and parcel of a journalism 
course).106 
Those two cases involved high school students whereas this 
discussion is concerned with college students, who have (by and 
large) reached the age of majority by the time they set foot on 
campus as students.  The debate regarding free speech zones is 
centered around speech outside of the classroom.  Taken together, 
these two facts mean that college administrators have fewer 
legitimate reasons to regulate speech since they lose such 
justifications as those related to the age of students and pedagogical 
purposes used to justify the regulation in Hazelwood.107  That does 
not mean that college administrators have no reason to regulate the 
happenings on their campus; however, their reasons are necessarily 
limited outside of the classroom context, which should ameliorate 
concern of overbearing restrictions.108  While colleges can hardly be 
said to act in loco parentis for their students anymore,109 what 
happens outside the classroom can certainly play a large part in a 
college’s educational mission.  School sponsorship and control of 
clubs, athletics, speakers, and other events are clear evidence that 
colleges have legitimate educational interests in a variety of 
activity outside of the classroom.110  Schools often even have 
educational goals related to student housing.111 
105. Id. at 273–75.
106. See id. at 272–73.
107. Id. at 274–75.
108. But see discussion of VMI, supra note 72.
109. See generally Z.W. Taylor, In Loco Parentis and the 21st Century U.S.
Institution of Higher Education (Sept. 27, 2018), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256516 [https://perma.cc/4AVS-ELRE]. 
110. See, e.g., University of Rhode Island Mission & Vision Statements,
U.R.I., http://www.gorhody.com/information/mission_statement [https:// 
perma.cc/C6XX-NLSE] (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (expressing the mission 
statement for the University of Rhode Island’s athletic department, which 
includes “nationally recognized for creating champions in the classroom, in 
competition, and in life”). 
111. See, e.g., Living and Learning Communities, U.R.I.,
https://web.uri.edu/housing/living-and-learning-communities/ [https://perma. 
cc/24KA-LE3Q] (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (explaining the now-popular “living 
LANGE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/24/2020  6:05 PM 
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Once it is accepted that college administrators have 
educational interests in a way that is virtually all-encompassing on 
campus—and even off campus for their students participating in 
school-sponsored activities such as athletics—then a desire to 
regulate speech in open, outdoor areas on campus becomes more 
understandable.  Many goals could be articulated to support such 
regulation.  To begin with, a school can provide an area that is 
guaranteed to be held open for expression (that is, they are 
“regulating” other conduct in this area by giving preference to 
expression).  Requiring students to give advance notice of use of the 
area can facilitate orderly use by ensuring various people or groups 
do not attempt to use the area simultaneously if their uses would 
clash with one another.  Such notice would also allow the school to 
prepare for uses which may attract negative attention from other 
students, perhaps in the form of a “heckler’s veto” or other 
harassment, and ensure the students using the zone are not so 
impeded. 
C. Criticisms of Free Speech Zones
Free speech zones have proved to be rather unpopular.  They
have drawn so much negative attention that some state legislatures 
have gone so far as to enact laws prohibiting schools from creating 
them.112  There are two main arguments that have been advanced 
against the use of free speech zones.  The first is that free speech 
zones are used in an effort to limit student expression to certain 
areas of a campus while disallowing most forms of expression in 
other open, outdoor spaces on campus.113  While it is true that 
colleges have attempted to do this to some degree in tandem with 
the establishment of free speech zones,114 the kind of free speech 
and learning communities,” where students are placed for on-campus housing 
based on their academic interests or program of study). 
112. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-5-144 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 23.1-401.1 (West 2018).  There is likely no meaningful legal effect to these
laws since they do not define what exactly a “free speech zone” is.
113. Free Speech Zones on America’s Campuses, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL
RTS. EDUC. (Sept. 19, 2013), https://www.thefire.org/infographic-free-speech-
zones-on-americas-campuses-2/ [https://perma.cc/8BHE-XB78]. 
114. In Roberts v. Haragan, defendant Texas Tech University argued that
the entirety of its campus besides its established free speech zones were limited 
public fora so that any speech restrictions would be subject merely to a 
reasonableness standard.  See 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 862 (N.D. Tex. 2004).  The 
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zone advocated for in this article would not make an attempt at any 
sort of Draconian limits on student expression.  Further, First 
Amendment jurisprudence already protects against unreasonable 
limits on speech on government property based on the property’s 
designated use, so attempts to ban all expression outside of a 
designated free speech zone are almost certainly 
unconstitutional.115  The second argument is that free speech zones 
represent an unwise restriction on student speech that will 
necessarily limit an open and productive student discourse.116 
Critics argue that free speech zones and other attempts to regulate 
student speech are incompatible with the idea that “universities are 
meant to be ‘bastions of free thought’ which prepare students for 
life in the larger society.”117  However, as discussed below, a well-
crafted free speech zone policy is not inconsistent with that goal. 
D. A Constitutional Free Speech Zone Advances First Amendment
Rationales
When a free speech zone is created in the right way with the 
right goals in mind, it can advance all three free speech rationales 
discussed above (marketplace theory, self-government, and 
autonomy) while limiting the concerns related to government 
speech regulations. 
school did not, however, make the free speech zone the exclusive area for speech 
and expression on campus as some have claimed.  Id. at 856–57 (explaining 
that the plaintiff was prospectively going to be allowed to give a speech and 
distribute literature outside of the school’s free speech zone).  But see TIMOTHY
ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES 278–79 (2009) (discussing Haragan and stating the court “did 
not ultimately reach the question whether the limitation of the [plaintiff’s] 
expression to the [free speech] gazebo area was unconstitutionally restrictive,” 
presumably because the plaintiff was not limited to expressing himself in the 
free speech area). 
115. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983); see also Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: 
Using Forum Analysis for Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related 
Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 500 (2005) (discussing that 
incompatibility of speech with the purpose of a forum is a prerequisite to 
regulating speech in the forum). 
116. See Huddleston, supra note 21, at 281.
117. See Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and
Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 504 (2009). 
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1. Criticisms of Speech Regulations Over-Rely on Marketplace
Theory
Returning to the criticisms of free speech zones outlined above, 
it is clear that such critiques rely only on the marketplace theory 
when arguing that free speech zones do not serve the goals of the 
First Amendment. As one commenter put it when expressly 
decrying the current cultural attitude towards campus speech, 
“more Americans must learn to conceptualize the university 
campus as a true marketplace of ideas.”118  However, forcing 
universities to be a “true marketplace of ideas” is certainly not 
something that is constitutionally required.  
The “true” marketplace would mean a complete lack of 
government control, which is viewed as ideal from a libertarian 
perspective.  However, this completely unregulated marketplace 
does not guarantee the furtherance of the self-government and 
autonomy rationales of the First Amendment.  One author, in 
critiquing marketplace-centered free speech theories, writes that 
“[t]he crucial assumption in [marketplace] theory is that the 
protection of autonomy will produce a public debate that will be . . . 
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”119  It is important to note 
that “autonomy” in the preceding quote is referring to general 
liberty to exercise freedom of expression, so it is a different breed of 
“autonomy” than what is referred to when discussing the autonomy 
rationale.  Thus, there is no distinction between the author saying 
that the most libertarian approach to free speech “prohibits 
government regulation” or that it “affords maximum protection of 
autonomy.”  As another commenter writes, “[m]arkets are generally 
good things, both for ordinary products and for speech.  But when 
the legal creation of a market has harmful consequences for free 
expression—and it sometimes does—then we must reevaluate it in 
light of free speech principles.”120  Since there is nothing that 
requires a “true marketplace” approach to the First Amendment, 
regulations which promote the self-government and autonomy 
rationales should not only be permitted, but encouraged. 
118. Id. at 542.
119. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1410 (1986). 
120. Sunstein, supra note 89, at 277.
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2. Adjusting the Market to Promote Self-Government and
Autonomy
Under the public forum doctrine, there is already the idea of 
“guaranteed access” to a platform in certain outdoor spaces as 
embodied by traditional public fora.  That guarantees that those 
spaces are “marketplaces” that will be held open by the government 
for expression.  There are not traditional public fora on college 
campuses.  However, the creation of a free speech zone can create a 
designated public forum for students.  Even the staunchest 
opponents of free speech zones would agree that setting aside an 
area for expression is a good thing; where the key point of 
contention seems to lie is to what extent time, place, and manner 
regulations may restrict the use of the areas.  So, while the 
designation of an area as one for expression is good in that it creates 
a “marketplace” for speech, how can (and should) that marketplace 
be regulated to ensure that it serves First Amendment rationales 
to the greatest extent possible? 
From the outset, the designation of a space as a free speech 
zone is valuable for students because venues on a college campus 
are many students’ primary and perhaps only place to meaningfully 
express themselves for most of the year.121  In this way, outdoor 
spaces on a college campus can be viewed as a limited resource for 
the students, and there is nothing that compels a university to set 
aside an area for expression.  Of course, if there is some open, 
outdoor area subject to no meaningful regulations, students could 
use it to express themselves, but then nothing would preclude a 
frisbee game from breaking out around a group of students 
engaging in expression.  If a school does set aside an area for 
expressive purposes, then speech gets preferential treatment in this 
space over other uses.  That provides students the closest thing 
possible to “guaranteed access” while ensuring schools can 
simultaneously meet their educational goals. 
A free speech zone promotes the First Amendment value of self-
government by providing a forum in which expression is given 
121. This situates students differently from non-students, who are
presumed (often erroneously) to have access to a variety of channels of 
communicating.  See ZICK, supra note 114, at 57 (discussing how courts 
generally treat public places as “fungible” in considering alternative channels 
in light of spatial restrictions on speech).  
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preference to other uses.  It also allows administrators to give 
preference to political expression, thus affording students an 
excellent opportunity to participate in the democratic process. 
Cultural forces against certain kinds of speech can be strong, and 
free speech zones can be used to ensure students expressing 
unpopular ideas are not forced out of open areas or shouted down 
while trying to express themselves therein.  Diversity of thought is 
important to self-government, and counter-speech is one of the 
more effective ways of defeating bad or harmful ideas.122  Free 
speech zones can be used to facilitate an effective discourse on given 
topics, perhaps by arranging uses or events which take differing 
viewpoints on the same topic close in proximity in time to one 
another. 
Autonomy is served simply by giving students of all kinds 
ample opportunity to express themselves in a public place.  Without 
a free speech zone, students may be limited in the ways they could 
do so while on campus.  Most university students are in the middle 
of young adulthood, an important time in life for developing one’s 
sense of self.  Opening a free speech zone not only affords students 
a place to self-realize in a variety of ways, but by doing so, the school 
is putting its express approval on engagement in political speech. 
That could encourage students to develop a sense of civic 
responsibility by using and observing others use free speech areas 
to express themselves about matters of public concern. 
There is an alternative way to give students “guaranteed 
access” to a place to speak on college campuses to consider; it could 
be done by forcing schools to treat their open, outdoor spaces like 
traditional public fora.  One court has taken That approach.  In 
Roberts v. Haragan, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas held that a university must treat any 
areas that, outside of a college campus, would be considered 
traditional public fora (such as park-like areas and sidewalks) as 
traditional public fora for its students.123  Notwithstanding the 
issue that this holding deviates from the current state of the public 
forum doctrine, the decision has other problems in reference to 
student speech.  The first is that such areas—when treated as 
traditional public fora—are just open, outdoor spaces, meaning that 
122. See Majeed, supra note 117, at 517–19.
123. See 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 861 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
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a university need not give any sort of preference to speech or 
expressive conduct therein.  Second, nothing requires a university 
to maintain the space in a way that gives it the physical 
characteristics of other traditional public fora; a school could easily 
change a park-like area into something else and thus evade the 
precepts of this theory.124 
In addition, the approach in Roberts v. Haragan is inferior to 
the approach advocated for here because free speech zones ensure 
that the “marketplace” is not dominated by certain groups, 
individuals, or viewpoints.  That is, a university that enforces a free 
speech zone policy in accordance with the principles discussed in 
this Comment will be able to provide a form of reinforcement for 
unpopular ideas that might otherwise be kept out of the 
marketplace altogether.  As one (decidedly unpopular) idea-holder 
explained, “[t]he fact is, people with weird beliefs are never going 
to win, because there’s not anything to back them up.”125  Some of 
the regulations that a university can impose include those which 
limit use of the zones to a maximum number of hours in a given 
week or month.  When a university is on advance notice that a 
person or group wants to use the space for expressive purposes, it 
can provide “back up” by ensuring ahead of time that the space is 
open for them.  Such regulations are especially useful for unpopular 
topics or viewpoints, which otherwise might be marginalized 
without some reinforcement by school administrators to keep time 
and space open for them. 
3. Free Speech Zones Allow for Adequate Academic Freedom
Not only are free speech zones conducive to students’ speech
rights, but they also allow for a healthy amount of academic 
freedom in deciding how exactly to administer the zones.  As 
mentioned above, it could be advantageous to an academic interest 
in comprehensive debate on public issues to situate planned 
speakers near each other in time.  Conceivably, if an administrator 
124. See ZICK, supra note 114, at 199–205 (discussing the grim trend of
privatization of public places that “demotes” traditional public fora into private 
spaces where owners have a nearly unlimited right of exclusion). 
125. DAVID K. SHIPLER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: MIGHTIER THAN THE SWORD 66
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dan Kleinman, owner of a 
website which, somewhat ironically, advocated for the removal of controversial 
books from libraries because of concerns that schoolchildren might read them). 
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notes two students or groups that wish to express themselves from 
different viewpoints on the same topic, they might even invite the 
users to partake in a debate with one another.  It would also be 
valuable to a school’s educational mission to give preference to free 
speech zone users who wish to express themselves on political 
topics, which in turn serves First Amendment rationales as well. 
Administrators are best situated to ensure the fair and orderly 
allocation of uses of their own facilities, and a space on campus for 
expression can and should be no different. 
Many educational interests go hand in hand with the First 
Amendment rationales discussed in the previous subsection. 
Educators have an interest in promoting self-government and 
encouraging students to exercise their autonomy to express 
themselves.  These goals are best served, especially in reference to 
the limited number of open, outdoor spaces on college campuses, by 
designating a space specifically for expression and implementing 
rules which guarantee a fair and orderly allocation of the uses 
thereof.  A school has an interest in having some notice of the 
intended uses of its facilities, and when it does have such notice, it 
can ensure such intended use is fulfilled.  This is no different from 
what universities already do with other facilities such as athletic 
fields and auditoriums; while it is probably fine to use such facilities 
when no one else is around, when someone reserves them ahead of 
time, they ought to be held open by the school for those that 
reserved them. 
4. Concern Regarding Government Regulation of Speech
Nobody can be blamed for being skeptical of any government
agent overseeing the way in which citizens express themselves. 
However, free speech zones are content-neutral regulations of 
expression.  One still might be concerned, however, about a 
disproportionate effect on certain kinds of content, or worse, certain 
kinds of viewpoints.126  That is, some regulations that are on their 
face content neutral may nevertheless have an impact which 
weighs heavier on some viewpoint or content, perhaps by 
prohibiting all speech on billboards in a town when all of the 
billboards are used by political activists working towards some 
126. See Langhauser, supra note 115, at 494 (calling viewpoint-based
restrictions more “pernicious” than content-based restrictions). 
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unpopular goal.127  It is not terribly hard to imagine, then, that on 
a college campus, placing restrictions on speech might lead to a 
disproportionate effect on conservative speech at the hands of the 
largely-liberal university bureaucracy. 
These concerns are ameliorated by several factors.  A well-
crafted free speech zone policy should have well-defined rules about 
the permissible manner and time for use.  That will eliminate the 
danger that administrators might ban some users with whom they 
disagree because of the violation of some ill-defined rule.128  The 
Supreme Court has also already made clear that speech regulations 
which vest too much discretion in a government agent are not 
permissible.129  Indeed, all administrators need do to serve their 
own interest is reserve the right to reschedule planned uses to 
different times because of conflicts or other educational interests; if 
an administrator reserves the right to cancel a planned use or to 
reschedule a desired use to any time with short notice, then such a 
policy would already run afoul of the constitution.130 
Administrators should also post schedules of planned uses publicly 
so that all can see how the site is used.  The observation of a healthy 
amount of transparency can also work against concerns of 
viewpoint discrimination. 
5. Free Speech Zones Will Not Unduly Restrict Speech in Other
Outdoor Areas
It is important to make it clear how free speech zones affect 
students’ rights in other outdoor spaces on campus.  To reiterate, a 
school designating a space or spaces as free speech zones does not 
mean that students lose their expressive rights on other outdoor 
spaces on campus.131  As discussed above, any regulations that 
schools try to impose on the areas other than the free speech zones 
would be subject to a reasonableness standard, which of course 
must be content and viewpoint neutral.132  So, a school conceivably 
127. See Sunstein, supra note 89, at 295–96.
128. See Majeed, supra note 117, at 499 (discussing how campus speech
codes are problematic because of their vagueness). 
129. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
131. See supra Section I.C.
132. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
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could limit expression in a variety of ways around its campus, but 
it is crucial to understand that the school’s power in this regard has 
nothing to do with free speech zones.  That is, schools already have 
this ability with or without a free speech zone on its campus.  
Although it should go without saying, any school that wishes 
to designate areas as free speech zones should be reasonable in 
where they locate them.  If a free speech zone is located in a barren 
part of campus, it will not do to serve any free speech rationales. 
Putting a free speech zone in an unreasonable place on campus may 
even present a legal problem for a school.  Take, for example, a 
group of students that wishes to show their support for a political 
candidate with signs, songs, and the distribution of literature on 
the campus quad where they could reach a large audience of 
student passersby, but are informed by administration that such 
activity can only be done in the free speech zone.  This particular 
free speech zone, however, is located in the nether regions of 
campus.  That situation may pose one in which the administration 
has not provided adequate “alternative channels” for the 
students.133  If the free speech zone were incorporated into the 
campus quad in this example, then there would be no problem for 
these students, so long as no other group had reserved the space or 
they had reserved it themselves.  
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing inherently unconstitutional or otherwise 
negative about free speech zones.  In light of the public forum 
doctrine and the fact that areas on university campuses have not 
been classified as traditional public fora, policies that set aside 
open, outdoor areas thereon should be applauded rather than 
criticized.  One can understand the concern, but the “marketplace 
of ideas” is not the only First Amendment rationale at play. 
Further, university administrators have an interest in regulating 
activity that takes place on their campus.  In so regulating, 
administrators can craft a free speech zone policy that ensures all 
its students who desire to express themselves have the opportunity 
to do so in an orderly, organized, fair, and safe way.  This will 
ensure that young adults across the country are afforded a chance 
133. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–
46 (1983). 
2020] FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 223 
to take part in discussions of public matters, which is vital to a 
democracy, while also allowing them to exercise their autonomy in 
other ways that they see fit without disrupting the normal 
operations of campus nor interfering with other students’ ability to 
do the same.  A well-crafted policy should also be transparent about 
how it intends to allocate time and space, as well as how it actually 
does so (such as by contemporaneously reporting requests for 
facility use and schedules) to ensure that administrators do not 
overstep their bounds and work against the First Amendment 
rationales that their policy is intended to serve.  
Finally, it is important to recall the exigencies of such policies 
to begin with, which are illustrated by the examples of controversial 
and hateful speakers and violent counter-protestors that have 
caused so many problems on university campuses.  Schools should 
not be required to stand by and hold their gates open as an 
unregulated “marketplace of ideas.”  Indeed, they must be allowed 
to create common-sense regulation to defend themselves against 
such disaster.  Many administrators probably desire to take all 
steps necessary to keep such events off their campus entirely, even 
if it means prohibiting as much speech as constitutionally 
permitted. Free speech zones represent a compromise between 
these two polarized choices that fairly balances the interests of 
university administrators and adamant dissenters alike. 
